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This paper presents the ﬁrst hedonic general-equilibrium estimates of quality-of-life and ﬁrm productivity
differences across Canadian cities, using data on local wages and housing costs. These estimates account for
the unobservability of land rents and geographic differences in federal and provincial tax burdens. Quality-
of-life estimates are generally higher in Canada’s larger cities: Victoria and Vancouver are the nicest overall,
particularly for Anglophones, while Montreal is the nicest for Francophones. These estimates are positively
correlated with estimates in the popular literature and may be predicted by differences in climate and culture.
Toronto is Canada’s most productive city; Vancouver, the overall most valued city.
Keywords: Quality of life, ﬁrm productivity, cost-of-living, ﬁrm productivity, compensating wage dif-
ferentials.
JEL Numbers: H24, H5, H77, J61, R11 Introduction
Wage and cost-of-living levels vary signiﬁcantly across Canadian cities and provinces, despite the fact that
capital and labor are largely mobile within Canada’s borders. Coulombe and Lee (1995) and Coulombe
(2000) ﬁnd that income and price levels converged signiﬁcantly between 1960 and 1980, but have converged
relatively little since then. These persistent differences in wages and prices are most naturally explained
by persistent differences in local advantages to households and ﬁrms, broadly termed as "amenities." To
clarify terminology, we say consumption amenities determine an area’s overall quality of life (QOL), while
production amenities determine an area’s overall productivity. The primary goal of this paper is to identify
the overall differences in quality-of-life and productivity levels across Canadian cities.
Some places in Canada have undeniable advantages over others. Most Canadians live south, close to the
United States border, where the climate is warmer and trading costs are lower than further north. Canadians
are acutely aware of regional disparities in natural resource wealth, from oil in Alberta, forests in British
Columbia, to depleted ﬁsh stocks in the Atlantic provinces. Much of the population is concentrated in a
handful of large cities, which beneﬁt from sizable agglomeration economies and vast cultural opportunities,
but also suffer disproportionately from urban disamenities such as crime, pollution, and congestion. Strong
local and provincial governments, as well as differential treatment of regions by the federal government,
also lead to geographic differences in public services and taxation.
While some places appear more advantaged than others, much of the population is still located in less
advantaged areas. Although heterogeneity in household tastes and production technologies may help explain
this, the importance of heterogeneity should not be overstated: most individuals prefer temperatures above
-40, and most ﬁrms beneﬁt from low transportation costs. Furthermore, many Canadians are quite mobile
over their lifetime and have only limited local attachments (e.g. Bernard et al. 2008).
In this setting, households and ﬁrms in areas with less advantageous amenities should be largely com-
pensated by more advantageous local prices. Speciﬁcally, households in areas with lower QOL should be
compensated either through higher nominal wages or lower costs-of-living. Firms in less productive areas
should be compensated through either lower labor or non-labor costs. This is the essence of the methodology
of Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982), which has been used extensively by researchers to measure QOL and
1productivity differences in the United States (e.g. Blomquist et al. 1988, Beeson and Eberts 1989; Gyourko
and Tracy 1991; Gabriel and Rosenthal 2004; Shapiro 2006; Chen and Rosenthal 2008).
Surprisingly, this popular methodology has never been applied to Canadian data. We explain this theory
in Section 2, using the framework by Albouy (2008a, 2009b), which realistically incorporates federal taxes
and produced non-tradable goods, such as housing, in a manner that Roback (1982) suggested, but never
implemented. In Section 3, we explain how we calibrate this model for Canada, and use the 2006 Census
microdata to estimate wage and housing-cost differences across Census Metropolitan Areas (CMAs), so as
to infer QOL and productivity differences across CMAs.
Several issues arise in applying the Rosen-Roback framework to Canada. First, while most areas of
Canada are mainly English-speaking, areas such as Quebec, are predominantly French-speaking, while
areas such as New Brunswick, are largely bilingual. Different language groups naturally have preferences
for different areas, as most would prefer to live where their mother tongue is predominant. Roback (1988)
and Beeson (1991) estimate QOL advantages for different groups deﬁned by education groups; we estimate
QOL for groups deﬁned by mother tongue, a more pre-determined characteristic. We also discuss, for
what appears to be the ﬁrst time, how the model may be aggregated across types, and be used to estimate
productivity differences across groups.
Second, unionization rates in Canada are still high relative to the United States, but vary across regions.
This means that some areas may have high real wage levels not because of low amenities, but because of
a strong union presence. We ﬁnd it most plausible to assume that union wage premia do not reﬂect urban
productivity or QOL differences, and use wage estimates purged of unionization effects.
Third, federal and provincial governments play a large role in taxing income and redistributing it through
intergovernmental transfers. The role of taxes on residents is dealt with in the model using adjustments in
Albouy (2008a; 2009a). It is less clear how the model should accommodate intergovernmental transfers
and ﬁscal disparities due to natural resource wealth, documented in Albouy (2010). Thus, we exclude these
from the main analysis, and consider them in alternative results at the end.
According to our estimates in Section 4, the CMA with the highest QOL is Victoria, followed by the
BC CMAs of Vancouver, Kelowna, Abbotsford, and then Toronto, Calgary, and Montreal. The rankings for
different language groups are almost completely mutually consistent in CMAs with signiﬁcant quantities of
each: Anglophones, Francophones, and Allophones all seem to prefer Montreal to Ottawa-Hull.
Our estimates of the productivity in tradeables, also the ﬁrst of their kind for Canada, reveal Toronto to
2be the most productive CMA, followed by Calgary, Oshawa, Vancouver, and Ottawa-Hull. While the QOL
of Anglophones in Montreal appears to be almost the same as in Toronto, their productivity is lower than
that of Anglophones in Kingston. This is consistent with the reasoning in Albouy (2008b) that, since 1970,
Anglophones ﬂed Montreal more from a loss of jobs than a loss of amenities.
Under the assumption that there are no sizable differences in unobservable heterogeneity in the produc-
tivity of non-tradeables, we create aggregate measures of the value of urban amenities to households and
ﬁrms, i.e. QOL and productivity in tradeables. According to this metric, the most valuable CMA per hectare
is Vancouver, followed by Victoria, Toronto, Calgary, Kelowna, and Montreal.1
While QOL greatly interests policy-makers and the general population, published indicators of QOL for
Canadian cities consist broadly of weighted sums of arbitrarily chosen amenities, with ad hoc weights. Such
indices are found in Cities Ranked & Rated, Places Rated Almanac, and Mercer’s Quality-of-Living Reports.
These shed light into what cities people appreciate the most only to the extent that the ad-hoc weighting
schemes used in their calculations actually reﬂect peoples’ values. The willingness-to-pay methodology
implemented here instead makes use of data on local wages and housing costs to identify the aggregate
value of the different amenities. We show in Section 5 that our estimates are generally in line with the
popular rankings, but that households put more weight on climate and arts and culture. Finally, in Section
6 we consider how our estimates would be inﬂuenced by including intergovernmental transfers, alternative
price data from the CPI, or using housing-cost data from rental units alone.2
2 Theoretical Model of Spatial Equilibrium
Quality-of-life and productivity differences across cities are measured from wage and housing-cost dif-
ferences across cities using the theoretical framework of Albouy (2008a, 2009a). This framework builds
upon that of Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982), but also accounts for non-labor income, housing production,
1Itshouldbenotedthattheserankingswouldchangeifinterprovincialﬁscaladvantageswereefﬁciently"equalized,"asproposed
in Albouy (2010): in this case, cities in the Atlantic and Prairie provinces fall in value, while those in Ontario rise.
2To our knowledge, the only attempt to measure QOL across Canadian cities in an economic framework, distantly related to
the one here, is Giannias (1998), who does so for 13 cities using 1981 data. This work measures QOL according to how housing
costs co-vary with six amenity measures, controlling for three housing characteristics, and assuming that incomes do not depend
on where households locate. This methodology depends on a highly parametric model with strict normality assumptions and a
linear housing price equation, which departs from more established log-linear speciﬁcations. Our model instead endogenizes wage
differences, controls for many worker and housing characteristics, is independent of any set of chosen amenities, and is illustrated
through graphs mapping the relationship of wage and housing-cost differences to QOL and productivity differences. Furthermore,
our analysis covers all 33 currently deﬁned Census Metropolitan Areas (CMAs), which we sometimes refer to as "cities," as well
as the non-metropolitan areas of Canada, organized by province or territory.
3cost-of-living differences from non-housing sources, and inequalities in both federal and provincial taxation.
Furthermore, we account for multiple household types to allow for language groups, like Roback (1988) and
Beeson (1991), but in a richer setting that deals with issues of aggregation and productivity measurement.
2.1 Setup
The national economy contains many cities, indexed by j, which trade with each other and share several





G). Each household consumes a numeraire traded good, x, and a group-speciﬁc non-traded
local good,3 yg, with local price, p
j
g, which varies by city and type. This accounts for the possibility that
households may consume housing in different neighborhoods or goods produced disproportionately by their
own type (e.g. Anglophones in Montreal live in certain neighborhoods and are more likely to consume
services produced by other Anglophones). In the empirical implementation of the model, the price of local
goods for type g is equated with the cost of housing paid by that type.4
Firms produce traded and local goods out of land, capital, and labor. Within a city, factors receive
the same payment in either sector. Land, L, within each city is homogenous and immobile, and is paid a
city-speciﬁc price rj; each city’s land supply, Lj(r), may depend positively on rj, with a ﬁnite elasticity
"
j
L;r 2 [0:1).5 Capital, K, is costlessly mobile across cities, and is paid the price ￿ { everywhere: this
price may be set either nationally or internationally, although for simplicity net foreign asset holdings are
set to zero. Households of each type g, Ng, are perfectly mobile within the country, have identical tastes
and endowments, and each supplies a single unit of labor. Because households care about local prices and




G), may vary across cities. The national number of
worker-households is ﬁxed at NTOT = (NTOT
1 ;:::;NTOT
G ), so that the sum of populations across cities
P
j Nj = NTOT. Households of each type own identical diversiﬁed portfolios of land and capital, which
pay an income Rg from land and Ig from capital, regardless of the city they live in. Gross income, m
j
g ￿
3The productivity differences in non-traded goods may be quite variable. Without separate data on land values across cities, it
is nearly impossible to identify them. However, Albouy (2009b) shows that this does not bias the quality-of-life estimates, and has
only a minor bias on the trade-productivity estimates for reasonable calibrations.
4AsshowninRoback(1980), theuseofasingletradedgoodmaybeusedtoapproximatethecaseofmultiplegoods. Factor-price
equalization, as in the Hecksher-Ohlin model of trade does not occur, because factors are mobile and many cities may specialize
in the production of fewer tradable goods than factors. Furthermore, non-housing goods may be considered to be a composite
commodity of traded goods and non-housing local goods.
5The assumption of homogenous land is used for simplicity, as we do not directly observe land values in any of our datasets.
As discussed in Albouy and Lue (2011), land values within CMAs may differ signiﬁcantly because of local amenities as well as
transportation costs. Our estimates may be taken as an average of the value of land within a city. Our QOL estimates implicitly
include a penalty for areas with higher transportation costs.
4Rg+Ig+w
j
g, varies across cities only as wages vary. Out of this income households pay a federal income tax
of ￿ (mg), which is redistributed in lump-sum transfers by city, T
j
g, which may vary by city. For expositional
ease, provincial taxes are discussed in the Appendix.
Cities differ in two types of attributes: quality of life, which raises household utility and is given by the




G), and productivity in the traded-good sector, which varies by factor and is given













￿ k), natural or artiﬁcial, according to some unknown functions Qj = e Q
￿
Zj￿




For a consumption amenity, e.g. safety or clement weather, @ e Qg=@Zk > 0; for a production amenity, e.g.
navigable water or agglomeration economies, @ e Ag=@Zk > 0. It is possible that a single amenity affects both
productivity and QOL.6
Household preferences are modeled by a utility function Ug (x;yg;Qg), that is quasi-concave over x




















g; ￿ ug) ￿ eg(p
j
g; ￿ ug;1), meaning that one-percent increase in Qg is equivalent to a one-percent increase
in disposable income. Since households are fully mobile, their utility must be the same across all the cities
that they inhabit. Thus, the after-tax income households earn in each city should equal the expenditure







for all types g and cities j where N
j
g > 0.
All input and goods markets are perfectly competitive, and ﬁrms produce under constant returns to scale.













used to produce the traded good, and N
j




Y gG) denote the labor used to produce each













etc. Then the production functions of representative traded-good and local-good ﬁrms are Xj = FX(A
j
N ￿
6It is worth noting that amenities may be endogenous to quantities in the model, and that this poses different problems when
measuring values by using comparative statics. For example, an increase in population, N
j, may lead to greater pollution, lowering
Q
j. If a city were to receive a theme-park, improving Q, this would raise N, raising pollution, and indirectly decreasing Q.
The value of the theme-park could be measured empirically by controlling for pollution, although the value when accounting for
pollution externalities should not control for pollution. Both direct and indirect effects of amenities have to be taken into account
when using comparative statics to determine the causal effect of an amenity on the attributes and prices in a city.



















Y g), for all g, where FX and FY g are concave and


























X) = 1g. As markets are competitive, ﬁrms make zero proﬁts in equilibrium,
so that
cX(wj;rj;￿ {;Aj) = 1 (2)
in all cities j. A symmetric deﬁnition holds for the unit costs in the local-good sectors, cY g, except that,
because of data limitations, we assume uniform productivity for all g and j
cY g(wj;rj;￿ {) = pj
g (3)
for all types g and cities j where N
j
g > 0.
Scalars with superscripts j refer to city-speciﬁc values, while those without superscripts refer to national









G). For households, de-
note the average share of gross expenditures spent on traded goods and local goods as sxg ￿ xg=mg and
syg ￿ pgyg=mg; denote the shares of income received from labor, land, and capital income asswg ￿
wg=mg; sRg ￿ Rg=mg, and sIg ￿ Ig=mg. Each share may be put into a vector of the form sx =
(sx1;:::;sxG). Using averages, it is possible to write the aggregate expenditure shares, sy = ￿￿sy, and
income shares sw = ￿￿sw, and so on. For ﬁrms producing traded goods, denote the cost shares of labor,
land, and capital as ￿Ng ￿ wgNXg=X, ￿L ￿ rLX=X, and ￿K ￿ ￿ {KX=X, with ￿N = (￿N1;:::;￿NG),
and the overall labor-cost share ￿N =
P
g ￿Ng. Denote similarly-deﬁned cost shares in the local -good
sector ￿gN, ￿gL, and ￿gK, with the cost-share of local -good g from labor type g0 given by ￿gNg0, so that
￿gN = (￿gN1;:::;￿gNG).
2.2 Measuring Quality of Life and Productivity
We begin by considering the case of where there is only one type of household, and continue with an
explanation of multiple types, showing under what assumptions we may aggregate results to reproduce the
single-type case.
62.2.1 Single Household Type
To analyze the effect of city attributes on prices we log-linearize the equilibrium conditions (1), (2), and (3)
around the national average. Thus, for any variable z, ^ zj = lnzj ￿ ln ￿ z ￿ =
￿
zj ￿ ￿ z
￿
=￿ z, approximates the
percent difference in city j of z relative to the geometric average ￿ z, which is the value for a nationally rep-
resentative city. Log-linearized versions of (1), (2), and (3) describe how prices co-vary with city attributes.
^ Qj = sy^ pj ￿ sw(1 ￿ ￿0) ^ wj ￿ dTj=m (4a)
^ Aj = ￿N ^ wj + ￿L^ rj (4b)
^ pj = ￿N ^ wj + ￿L^ rj (4c)
These equations are ﬁrst-order approximations around a nationally-representative city and so the share val-
ues are national averages. Equation (4a) measures the QOL differential, ^ Qj, from how high the cost-of-
living, sy^ pj, is relative to after-tax nominal income, sw(1 ￿ ￿0) ^ wj, and transfer differences, expressed as a
fraction of income, dTj=m. Thus, ^ Qj expresses the fraction of income households are willing to pay – or
if negative, to accept – to live in city j relative to a city with an average QOL. Equation (4b) measures the
productivity differential, ^ Aj, from how high the labor costs, ￿N ^ wj, and land costs, ￿L^ rj, are in traded-good
production. It measures the percent cost-savings that ﬁrms experience from locating in city j relative to
the national average. Equation (4c), constrains the local -good price differential, ^ pj, to equal the labor-cost
differential, ￿N ^ wj, plus the land-cost differential, ￿L^ rj.
In practice, wage and local -good price differentials are observable and so QOL differentials are mea-
surable directly from (4a). Land-rents are generally unobserved, making it difﬁcult to measure productivity
directly from (4b). However, by assuming that local -good productivity is the same across cities, it is possible

















7The total value of amenity-differences for city j is equal to the QOL differential plus the productivity dif-
ferential times its share of expenditure













The second equality, expressed in terms of observable variables, results from substituting in (4a) and (4b):
Collecting terms and using (5), and simplifying, we obtain that the total amenity differential, which ex-
presses the social value of land, is equal to the differential value of private land rents, measured as a percent
of income, plus the ﬁscal externalities in terms of additional federal taxes paid net of federal transfers re-
ceived.
^ ￿j = sR^ rj + ￿0sw ^ wj ￿ dTj=m (8)
As discussed in Albouy (2009b), the assumption that local-good productivity is the same across cities does
little to bias the measure of tradable productivity, but can produce substantial bias in measures of the private
and social value of land. 8
2.2.2 Multiple Household Types and Aggregation
With multiple types, the log-linearized version of the mobility condition (1) is
^ Qj
g = syg^ pj
g ￿ swg(1 ￿ ￿0
g) ^ wj
g ￿ dTj=mg (9)
for each group g. Note that this requires each group’s price and wage differentials, ^ p
j
g and ^ w
j
g, but also each
group’s speciﬁc marginal tax rate, ￿0
g, expenditure share syg and income share swg. It is possible to deﬁne an
aggregate quality-of-life index ^ Qj ￿ ￿j￿^ Q
j
that is consistent with the single-type index in (4a) if we deﬁne






g, the aggregate wage as differential






g, and assume that all groups face the same marginal tax rate ￿0.
With multiple labor types, the zero-proﬁt condition for tradable-good producing ﬁrms is ^ Aj = ￿N ￿
^ wj + ￿L^ rj; where ^ Aj ￿ ￿N ￿ ^ A
j
N + ￿L ^ A
j
L + ￿K ^ A
j
K which estimates productivity using the labor-cost
8Higher productivity in non-tradables tends to lower wages and prices by a relatively small amount, and in the same proportion
that trade productivity raises them. More generally, the measure of productivity we use strongly reﬂects higher levels of tradable
productivity and, more weakly, lower levels of non-tradable productivity.
8measure with ￿
j
N ￿ ^ wj. A potential problem with this approximation is that the local cost shares, ￿
j
N; may
vary considerably from the national ones, ￿N. But, when each group g’s fraction of total labor costs in city
j, ￿
j









for all g (10)
the single wage measure proposed above, ^ wj, reﬂects labor costs with local cost shares, ￿
j
N, so that ￿N ^ wj =
￿
j
N ￿ ^ wj. Thus, estimates from equation (4b) still measure overall productivity, as before, although they
reﬂect the factors in proportion to how they are used locally, rather than nationally.
In Appendix A.1, we show that using this same assumption it is possible to estimate the land-rent
differential using equation (5) from aggregate wage and housing-cost differences, using the approximations
￿L = (sR ￿ sx￿L)=sy and ￿N = (sw ￿ sx￿N)=sy. Thus we can have a feasible estimate of productivity
from (6) above that estimates the marginal productivity of land through residential housing. Furthermore, if
federal marginal tax rates for groups are the same, then the total value of amenities is still given by (7).
As households are perfectly mobile and each type has homogenous tastes, we should expect households
to sort across CMAs according to their tastes for local amenities. The centrifugal forces of household
preferences may be countered by centripetal forces in production, if different labor types are imperfectly
substitutable. In fact, when labor types are imperfect substitutes, the relative productivity of individual
types is not inferrable from wage and price information alone. Such inference also requires information
on relative factor usage in the traded sector. Using the labor-demand equations for the traded sector, it




1X ￿ ^ N
j
2X = ￿￿12( ^ w
j
1 ￿ ^ w
j
2) + (￿12 ￿ 1)( ^ A
j
1 ￿ ^ A
j
2) (11)
where ￿12 is the elasticity of substitution between type-1 and type-2 labor.9 Intuitively, this (along with
ﬁxed land supplies) produces downward sloping demand for particular labor types. For instance, one can
imagine that producers of tradable output in Montreal could ﬁnd that having a few native English speakers to
be very productive for helping to export its products. However, because of provincial laws requiring the use
of French in the workplace, these workers would be less productive than comparable native-French speakers
9This equation is often seen in the analysis of skill-biased technical change (e.g. Violante 2008).
9if they were employed in equal proportion. Similarly, Allophones may have some idiosyncratic skills that
are imperfect substitutes for those possessed by other language groups, much as Ottaviano and Peri (2006)
found for immigrants relative to natives in the United States.
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+ ^ Aj (12)
This formula implies that the greater the elasticity of substitution between the two labor types, the more
important wage differences are relative to employment differences in reﬂecting productivity differences.
When labor types are strong substitutes, wages must offset the productivity differences of different types: as
￿12 ! 1, ^ A
j
2 = ( ^ w
j








N2) + ^ Aj, which in the case where N1 and N2 are the only two
factors is just ^ A2 = ^ w2. But when substitution possibilities are more limited, ﬁrms are less able to bid up the
relative wage of more productive labor, and information on relative factor usage becomes more important.
3 Empirical Implementation
To apply our model to Canada, we estimate city-speciﬁc wage and price differentials using Census micro-
data for the reference year 2005 and calibrate the cost, income, expenditure, and tax parameters from other
sources.10
3.1 Data and the Estimation of Wage and Housing-Cost Differentials
We estimate wage and housing-cost differentials using the 20 percent sample of Canadian Census data from
the 2006 Masterﬁle Microdata Files. Most of the differentials apply to a Census Metropolitan Area (CMA),
which consist of municipalities located around an urban core with a population of at least 100,000. The
remaining differentials are for non-CMA areas grouped by province. In total, there are 33 CMAs and 13
non-CMA areas. Appendix B provides greater detail.
10The reference year for the earnings is the 2005 calendar year. For housing costs, it is the monthly average over the past 12
months with the reference day of interview being May 16, 2006. For renters, it is the current monthly rent paid.
103.1.1 Wage Differentials and Union Adjustments
The inter-urban wage differentials come from a sample of full-time workers, ages 25 to 55, and control
for observable skill differences across workers. Thus, for each language group, determined by the mother
tongue of the worker, we regress log wages on CMA-indicators (￿
j
w) and on extensive controls (Xi
w) – fully
interacted with gender – for potential work experience, education, ﬁeld of study, occupation, industry, and





w. The estimated values of ￿
j
w, normalized to
have a population-weighted average of zero, are our estimates of the log-wage differentials, ^ w
j
g. We interpret
them as the causal effect of city characteristics on a worker’s wage. Identifying these differentials requires
that workers do not sort across cities according to their unobserved skills.11 The overall differential for each
city, ^ wj; is equal to the average of the ^ w
j
g for each language group, weighted by the number of workers in
each city.12
When controlling for location, Allophones earn wages 8.6 percent lower than Anglophones while Fran-
cophones and Anglophones earn very similar wages. 13 These differences within CMA’s could be due to a
variety of reasons, such as school quality or discrimination (Albouy 2008b).
As we document in Appendix Table A3, union coverage rates in Canada are high and differ substantially
across CMAs, with coverage rates varying from 23 percent in Calgary to almost 50 percent in Quebec,
Sherbrooke, and Thunder Bay. To the extent that wages reﬂect marginal productivity and unions raise them
beyond this competitive rate, it is appropriate to adjust them in order to estimate productivity levels. It is
theoretically ambiguous whether union wage premia should be discounted when estimating QOL. If union
jobs are readily accessible to new migrants, and these higher premia are reﬂected in higher rents and other
costs-of-living, then it would be inappropriate to discount the premia. However, if workers union wage
premia do not result in higher local costs-of-living, then it is sensible to discount them. Otherwise, real
incomes in highly unionized areas may be high relative to the local QOL, and QOL estimates in highly
11This assumption may not hold completely: Glaeser and Maré (2001) argue that up to one third of the urban-rural wage gap
could be due to selection, suggesting that at least two thirds of wage differentials are valid, although this issue deserves greater
investigation. At the same time, it is possible that the estimates could be too small, as some control variables, such as occupation
or industry, could depend on where the worker locates.
12Note that in practice, some workers live and work in different CMAs. We determine the CMA of a worker by their place of
work, so that our productivity estimates are clearly characteristic of the city. The QOL estimates should on the whole also be more
accurate, since they will represent the wages and costs faced by workers with relatively modest commutes. Regardless, the results
are almost identical if we assign wage differentials by place of residence, rather than place of work.
13Although these differentials control for what ofﬁcial languages the worker speaks, the Census does not indicate how proﬁcient
respondents are in their languages. It seems likely that self-reported bilingual Anglophones speak English better than self-reported
bilingual Francophones do, and vice versa.
11unionized areas will be biased downwards.
Unfortunately the Census data does not contain information on union coverage. We were able to cal-
culate CMA-level unionization rates from the Labour Force Survey, although these rates are not available
by mother tongue. We eliminate inferred union-wage premia by multiplying the union coverage rates by
a premium of 7.7 log points, taken from Fang and Verma (2002), and subtracting them from the original
estimates of ^ wj, renormalizing them to have a population-weighted average value of zero.
The importance of the public sector varies greatly by cities. For example, a little less than 40 percent
of workers are employed in the public sector in Ottawa compared to less than 15 percent in Toronto. Like
unionization, this potentially has an impact on wages. To control for this, we account for the percentage of
the workforce in each CMA that works in a public sector job.
3.1.2 Housing-Cost Differentials
Following previous studies (e.g. Gabriel and Rosenthal 2004), we use both housing values and gross rents,
including utilities, to calculate housing-cost differentials. For owned units, we multiply housing values times
a discount rate of 7.85 percent (Peiser and Smith 1985), and add utility costs, to impute rents comparable
to gross rents. We regress the logarithm of these rents on ﬂexible controls (Xi
w) – interacted with renter-






p . The coefﬁcients ￿
j
p, normalized to have a population-weighted average of zero, are
our estimates of the housing-cost differentials, ^ pj. Proper identiﬁcation of housing-cost differences requires
that average unobserved housing quality, and the extent of foreign investment, do not vary systematically
across cities.14
Controlling for CMA, we ﬁnd that Allophones have housing costs that are 1.62 percent lower, while
Francophones have housing costs that are 124.16 percent lower. The lower housing costs of Francophones
potentiallyreﬂectthatAnglophonesmayliveinmoreamenableareaswithinCMAs, suchinMontreal, where
historic Anglophone neighborhoods are generally considered very amenable. It may be that Anglophones
face a more restricted housing market or enjoy better housing quality that we cannot control for.
14Unobserved housing quality differences should be minor, as Malpezzi et. al. (1998) determine that housing-cost indices
derived from the U.S. Census in this way perform as well or better than most other indices. As well, in the admittedly limited data
available, foreign investments in major Canadian housing markets appear to be small. For instance, Tal (2011) uses Landcor data,
a comprehensive database on historical sales and current information on the BC residential and commercial markets, to document
that only 2.6% of all sales over the past ﬁve years can be accounted by owners whose tax notice is sent to addresses outside of
Canada.
123.2 Calibration
The calibrated values for the parameters are similar to those for the United States found in Albouy (2009b),
except that we amend them for Canada to account for a smaller share of income received by labor, and a
smaller proportion of expenditures spent on locally-produced goods.
sx = 0:67 ￿L = 0:025 ￿L = 0:25 sR = 0:10
sy = 0:33 ￿N = 0:775 ￿N = 0:55 sw = 0:70
￿K = 0:20 ￿K = 0:20 sI = 0:20
Information on income and expenditure share differences by language group is lacking, and so we assume
they are the same, which allows us to use equation (10) for our estimates.
The elasticity of substitution between different labor types is unknown. Ottaviano and Peri (2006)
estimate the elasticity of substitution between immigrants and non-immigrant workers to be about 6.5. It
would seem that the elasticity of substitution between workers of different language groups is much higher
than this elasticity, given that the workers were often born and raised in Canada, and thus have even more
similar skills.15 Thus, we use two potential values for ￿: 1 and 40, where the latter illustrates the case of
imperfect substitutability.
Although federal tax differences are included in the analysis, federal transfer and spending differences
are not. There are three ways that these spending differences could manifest themselves. To the extent that
they beneﬁt households, they contribute to ^ Qj; to the extent that they beneﬁt ﬁrms, they contribute to ^ Aj;
to the extent that they are wasted by governments, they show up nowhere. Since it is not theoretically clear
where they belong, they are reported separately in Section 6.1.
Calculated tax differentials depend on both federal and provincial tax rates. They include direct taxes on
income as well as indirect taxes on consumption: since this is a static model without an intertemporal savings
decision, the two are equivalent as taxes on consumption reduce the buying power of labor. We determine
provincial differentials using wage differences within province only. Across provinces, the average marginal
tax rate on labor income is 28 percent. See the Appendix for more details.16
15We include immigrant controls to capture differences in immigrant/Canadian born earning outcomes. See the Appendix for
more detail.
16Many workers report receiving little income other than labor income. However, given the static nature of the model, a worker’s
choices should be modeled to account for a worker’s permanent income, which includes a large non-labor component, particularly
if implicit rental earnings from one’s own home are included.
134 Quality-of-Life and Productivity Estimates
4.1 Main Estimates
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 1 report the estimated wage and housing-cost differentials by CMA or non-
CMA areas of provinces. Figure 1 graphs these and provides intuition for how we infer overall QOL and
productivity differentials, reported in columns 4 and 5. The ﬁgure displays the average mobility condition
from (4a), with ^ Qj = 0, and the combined average zero-proﬁt conditions from (6), with ^ Aj = 0. The
average mobility condition illustrates the housing costs households are willing to pay, on average, for a given
wage: any premium above that housing cost level is inferred to be payment for consumption amenities, and
thus the vertical distance from that condition indicates overall QOL, ^ Qj. The combined zero-proﬁt condition
illustrates the rate at which land rents, inferred through housing costs, must fall, on average, as wages
rise: any premium over this is inferred to be payment for production amenities, and thus the vertical (or
horizontal) distance from that condition indicates overall ﬁrm productivity in the traded sector, ^ Aj. Through
a change in the coordinate system, the two conditions in Figure 1 provide a set of axes for the new coordinate
system in Figure 2, which is in the space of productivity and QOL.
Interestingly, Canada’s ﬁve largest CMA’s – Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, Ottawa-Hull, and Calgary,
all have above-average productivity and QOL, as they lie above the average mobility-condition, and to
the right of the average zero-proﬁt condition. The smaller cities of Halifax, and Kelowna all have above-
average QOL but much lower productivity, which is commensurate with their reputations as charming tourist
destinations. Kitchener, Oshawa, and Windsor have less-than-average QOL, but are quite productive given
their size, although this is likely to do with their proximity to Toronto and Detroit. Also in this category are
the Territories, where high wages simultaneously reﬂect the high marginal productivity of the workers out
there, as well as the need for those workers to be compensated for the harsh climate and remote location.
Finally, a large number of smaller cities, including Moncton, Regina, St. John’s, Thunder Bay, and Trois-
Rivières fall in the category of cities with below-average productivity and QOL, with the compensating
beneﬁt of being affordable. All of the non-CMA areas of provinces (except for BC) also fall in this category,
suggesting that on average neither ﬁrms nor households ﬁnd less urban areas to be exceptionally attractive.
TherankingsofthecitiesintermsofoverallQOL,productivity, andcombinedvaluearegiveninTable2.
Victoria has the highest QOL, followed by Vancouver, Kelowna, Abbotsford, and Toronto. Rounding out the
top ten are Calgary, Montreal, Sherbrooke, Ottawa-Hull, and Barrie. Saint John, Windsor, and Thunder Bay
14take the bottom three spots. This list contrasts signiﬁcantly with Giannias (1998), which places Edmonton
and Winnipeg in the top 4 of 13 cities, which here are ranked 17 and 24 out of 33.
From the second column of Table 2, we see that Toronto is the leader in productivity, which is not
surprising given that it is the largest city, and home of the ﬁnancial center of Canada. Second is Calgary,
only the ﬁfth largest CMA at that time, but with a strong oil and gas industry. Third, is Oshawa, as it is
50 kilometers from Toronto, with a strong base in automobile manufacturing. Vancouver, and Ottawa-Hull
round out the top ﬁve. All of these cities pay a disproportionate share of federal taxes per capita, as seen in
column 7 of Table 1, as a result of being so productive. Despite being the second largest CMA in Canada,
Montreal is only in tenth place, possibly because of its language barrier with the rest of Canada and the
United States.
The land-rent and total-value differentials are reported in columns 6 and 8 in Table 1, with their dif-
ference caused by the tax differentials in column 7, and the ranking reported in column 3 of Table 2. Their
calculation is made visually transparent in Figures 1 and 2 through the average iso-rent and iso-value curves:
cities above these lines have above-average rents and total values, respectively. From these we see that Vic-
toria has the highest private value of land, although Vancouver has the highest social value, as its higher
wage levels lead to greater positive tax externalities for other Canadians.
4.2 Estimates for Separate Language Groups
QOL measures broken down by mother tongue are presented in Table 3 for CMAs with at least 100,000
inhabitants with that mother tongue, and where they constitute at least 10 percent of the population. Calcu-
lating QOL measures for cities where a smaller number of individuals have a certain mother tongue raises
difﬁcult econometric issues.17 On the whole, the QOL rankings for the different language groups are al-
most identical to those pooling everyone together. For instance, all of the groups prefer Montreal over
Ottawa-Hull. The only discrepancy is minor: unlike Anglophones, Allophones appear to view Hamilton
slightly more favorably than Ottawa-Hull, perhaps because they make up a larger fraction of the population.
Francophones do not seem to despise living in linguistically diverse CMAs, as Montreal and Ottawa-Hull
are their top two cities, while the worst two are Trois-Rivières and Chicoutimi-Jonquière. Allophones prefer
17In places where a linguistic group is in a small minority, the calculated wage differentials tend to be relatively low and the
housing-cost differentials between language groups relatively high. This would seem to suggest that these groups ﬁnd places
where the mother tongue are very amenable. See Warman (2007) for Canadian analysis and evidence of enclaves. It is likely that
these individuals have idiosyncratic attachments, such as spouses, that cause them to sacriﬁce real income in order to live in these
places.
15Canada’s three largest cities, Vancouver, Toronto, and Montreal, over all other ones, supporting the notion
that Allophones will prefer to live in areas with the greatest number of like-tongued speakers.
The individual productivity of different language groups is given in Table 4 for just a few cities where
the supply of each group is large enough to produce credible estimates. Panel A considers the productivity
differences between Francophones and Anglophones in Montreal and Ottawa-Hull. In Montreal, average
productivity is 3 percent above the national average, and Francophones are better paid and much more heav-
ily employed than Anglophones. If both types of workers are perfect substitutes, then Francophones from
Montreal are 4 percent more productive than the average Francophone, while Anglophones are 4 percent
less productive, making them about as productive as Anglophones in Kingston. If Anglophones provide
special skills that cannot be easily substituted for by Francophone labor, then the productivity differences
are even larger: with an elasticity of substitution of 40, an Anglophone worker in Montreal is only 10 per-
cent less productive, comparable Anglophones in Saskatoon, and wages are as high as they are only because
Francophones cannot easily replace them. The results for Ottawa-Hull are much less extreme since their
national wage and employment differentials are roughly the same.
Panel B considers the productivity differences between Anglophones and Allophones in Toronto and
Vancouver. In both CMAs, Allophones earn less of a premium than Anglophones do, but are hired in a
greater proportion, relative to the national average. Thus, the less substitutable Allophone labor is for An-
glophone labor, the closer their relative productivity differentials. It appears that Anglophones in Vancouver
have productivity levels just behind Calgary and ahead of Oshawa.
5 Relationship with Popular Rankings and Amenities
The press abounds with popular rankings of Canadian cities according to many characteristics aimed at
capturing "livability." Here, we compare our rankings based on revealed preference with the livability ratings
from Places Rated Almanac and Cities Ranked and Rated. The popular measures are not grounded in theory
and are largely ad-hoc, they reﬂect popular perceptions of what characteristics make cities “nice” to live in.
Unlike the rankings based on willingness-to-pay, the popular rankings also incorporate low cost-of-living
and good job-market opportunities as “amenities”. In the hedonic framework above, if these factors are
properly weighted, they should make all of the cities offer the same utility, making them equally "livable."
In practice, the popular rankings put less weight on cost-of-living and job-market opportunities than the
16framework suggests.18
Table 5 reports the correlation coefﬁcients between the rankings in these reports and the overall QOL
ranking shown in Table 1. The correlations are all strongly positive, with the correlation between the two
popular rankings being somewhat stronger than that between either popular ranking and the economic one.
These correlations are strong despite the fact that the popular rankings include offsetting cost-of-living and
job-market opportunities. The general consistency of the rankings seems to be mutually reinforcing to both
the economic and popular measures of QOL.
Table 6 estimates the relationship between the economic QOL estimates and various subindices given
to cities by Places Rated Almanac. The overall livability index in the Almanac puts equal weight on all of
the estimates. Hedonic estimates based on the economic measures of QOL indicate that only the indices
for climate and arts and culture have a signiﬁcant relationship with households’ willingness-to-pay. This
holds true whether or not CMAs are weighted by population. With only 24 overlapping CMAs in the
sample, this test does have low power; indeed factors related to health, crime, and education may be very
important in households’ location decisions. But it appears unlikely that Places Rated was correct to assign
each sub-index the same coefﬁcient: our economic QOL index suggests that the restriction that all of the
subindices should have equal coefﬁcients is strongly rejected by the data. Understandably, Canadians care
tremendously about climate, and apparently quite a bit about arts and culture, or other amenities that are
correlated with those sub-indexes.
6 Additional Considerations
The model presented above has the advantage of requiring limited data, and of being intuitive to graph. Yet,
additional considerations should be examined which may affect the estimates, in particular with regards to
the role of non-housing costs, differences in non-tax federal ﬁscal beneﬁts, and the use of rents instead of
housing prices. Given that it is not clear whether or not these considerations should be incorporated into the
estimation of QOL and productivity differentials, and given that they would also be based on incomplete
data, available only at the provincial level, they are presented separately in Table 7. The preceding results
are also summarized at the provincial and regional levels here.19
18For instance, in Places Rated, cost-of-living and employment opportunities, are counted as 2 among 9 amenities, all of which
receive equal weight.
19CMA-level adjustments for QOL and total value, assuming that federal transfers are passed on directly to households, are
presented in Tables A1 and A2.
176.1 Intergovernmental Transfers
An adjustment for intergovernmental transfers and provincial source-based tax revenues is made in column
9. Recall that if these payments beneﬁt households, they should be subtracted from QOL; if they beneﬁt
ﬁrms, the should be subtracted from productivity: in either case they should be subtracted from the total
value. On the other hand, if these payments beneﬁt neither households nor ﬁrms, than they should be
ignored altogether. Assuming that the payments do affect the total value in some form, they raise the value
of Ontario and Quebec, while the Atlantic and the Prairie provinces are seen as less valuable. As analyzed
in greater detail in Albouy (2010), this is mainly driven by equalization payments, except for Alberta and
Saskatchewan, which receive large ﬁscal beneﬁts by retaining the revenues from taxes on natural resources,
rather than sharing them federally.
6.2 Non-Housing Costs
According to intercity estimates of the Consumer Price Index, non-housing cost differences are not always
proportional to housing-cost differences, as we assumed above. If non-housing costs in an area are high rel-
ative to housing costs, then the cost-of-living measure approximated by housing costs is biased downwards
in that area. This causes QOL measures in areas with high non-housing costs to be biased downwards. This
may be the case in more remote areas of Canada, such as the Territories, where housing is relatively cheap,
but other goods are expensive because of transportation costs.20
Unfortunately, only one city per province has detailed CPI information. As a result, we need to assume
that provincial cost differences are reﬂected in the representative CMAs, typically each province’s largest.
These adjustments, in column 10, suggest that QOL and total values may be underestimated in the Atlantic
provinces, especially Newfoundland, and overestimated in Quebec.
6.3 Housing Rents
Our main analysis measures housing costs by combining actual rents with imputed rents for owner-occupied
units. There may be reason to doubt the accuracy of these imputed rent measures, especially during our time
20Unfortunately, the intercity CPI estimates do not reliably measure housing costs as they rely on a subsample of new housing
generally built on the urban fringe. "The sample of builders for each metropolitan area is determined through the use of local
market intelligence and veriﬁed against relevant building permit data. Where possible, prices are collected from builders who
develop entire subdivisions, usually on large tracts of land." The Census sample is more reliable as it samples all housing. For
example in Vancouver, the CPI estimates that housing is only 10 percent over the national average, as opposed to 43 percent
according to the Census data.
18period, as housing prices in some markets rose considerably up until 2006. We construct alternate measures
using only rented units, which we plot in Appendix Figure A1 against our main estimates of housing costs.
As seen in column 11 of Table 7, rents tend to differ less in value across provinces, although using these
measures has a fairly minor effect on the overall rankings.
We believe rent-only measures are less accurate than our main measures. Rental units tend to be more
centrally located than owned units, and hence less representative of the overall CMA, especially as the
majority of Canadians own their homes. In addition home-ownership rates are generally higher in larger
CMAs. Our main housing-cost measures are less prone to potential bias resulting from sample-selection
issues.
7 Conclusion
This paper presents the ﬁrst hedonic estimates of QOL and local productivity differences for Canada, ac-
counting for heterogeneity in mother tongues and unionization rates. These estimates are rather sensible and
intuitive, with the QOL measures exhibiting a strong positive correlation with popular rankings. We ﬁnd
Victoria has the greatest quality of life, Toronto has the highest productivity, and Vancouver has the most
valuable combination of the two. Among cities that they jointly inhabit, Canada’s different language groups
appear to largely agree on what cities are more attractive, even when they live in different neighborhoods.
Local productivity is largely determined by size, but is also affected by other factors such as predominant
language, access to natural resources, and proximity to other large cities.
Overall, our estimates measure how valuable different Canadian cities are, not only in producing the
goods that households value, but also in delivering the amenities that households want. Most Canadians
seem to prefer living in large metropolitan areas and are willing to consume less in order to live in them.
Despite Canada’s enormous wealth in natural resources, the greatest resource Canadians seem to value in
production and consumption is each other.
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21Appendix
A Additional Theoretical Details
A.1 Multiple Household Types
A.1.1 Land-Rent Estimate







g ￿ ￿gN￿^ wj￿
Instead of trying to estimate land rents directly, we take an indirect approach, using the fact that aggregate
value of land rents differences should equal the weighted value of amenities minus federal tax payments,
and then substituting in our disaggregated indices:
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^ pj ￿ ￿N ^ wj￿
So each type just needs to be weighted by their share of income when producing rent and productivity
estimates.
A.1.2 Factor-Speciﬁc Productivity Estimates
Factor-speciﬁc productivity differences do have ﬁrst-order effects on quantities in the model. For exam-
ple, in the case where partial elasticities of substitution across factors within sectors are equal, the relative
iemployment of 1-types relative to 2-types is given by
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The productivity differential may be split into the two components for the labor types of interest, and all of
the other factors:
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We assume that all of the other factors have the same relative productivity levels, i.e. ^ A
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A.2 Provincial and Federal Taxes Combined
Individual provinces may not only have signiﬁcant tax rates on income, but also signiﬁcant wage differences
within them. This means that the tax differentials faced by households in different cities consist of two com-
ponents: a federal component and a provincial component. Let the tax burden be given by two components,
a federal F and a provincial, P: ￿(m) = ￿F (m) + ￿P(m). Assuming that federal revenues are distributed
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where ^ wP is the wage differential of the province on average. At the provincial level, the provincial burden
is even and so we may easily calculate






iiWhile for a given city the formula is slightly more complicated.
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B Data and Estimation
We use Canadian Census data from the 2006 Master Microdata Files to calculate wage and housing-cost
differentials. The wage differentials are calculated for workers ages 25 to 55, who report working at least 30
hours a week, 26 weeks a year. The CMA assigned to a worker is determined by their place of work. The
wage differential of an CMA is found by regressing log hourly wages on individual covariates and indicators
for a worker’s CMA, using the coefﬁcients on these CMA indicators. The covariates consist of
￿ 12 indicators of educational attainment;
￿ a quartic in potential experience (years of school are calculated using the 2001 Master Microdata Files
for the highest level of education);
￿ 18 indicators for major ﬁeld of study;
￿ 15 indicators of industry (2002 NAICS);
￿ 25 indicators of occupation (2006 NOC-S);
￿ An indicator for married/common-law;
￿ An indicators for immigrant status, and controls for time since immigration and citizenship status;
￿ 5 indicators of minority status (Black, Chinese, South Asian, Aboriginal and other) interacted with
immigrant status;
￿ Indicators for bilingualism interacted with mother tongue – French, English, or other – and for other
mother tongue interacted with speaking only French and only English;
All covariates are interacted with gender.
We ﬁrst run the regression of log wages on the individual covariates and CMA indicators using census-
person weights. From the regressions a predicted wage is calculated using individual characteristics alone
to form a new weight equal to the predicted wage times the census-person weight. The new weights (which
have only a small effect) are then used in a second regression, which regresses the residuals from the ﬁrst
regression on mother tongue and CMA indicators. The coefﬁcients on the CMA indicators are taken as
the overall wage effect. For the mother-tongue speciﬁc wage effects, the residuals from the ﬁrst regression
are regressed on CMA indicators interacted with mother tongue indicators, using the coefﬁcients on these
interactions.
Housing-cost differentials are calculated using the logarithm of housing costs, which are either reported
gross rents or imputed rents derived from housing values. The differential housing cost of a CMA is calcu-
lated in a manner similar to wages, except using a regression of rent on a set of covariates at the unit level.
The covariates for the adjusted differential are
￿ 9 indicators for the number of rooms, 5 indicators for the number of bedrooms, number of rooms
interacted with number of bedrooms, and the number of rooms per household member;
iii￿ 7 indicators for the type of building;
￿ 9 indicators for when the building was built;
￿ 2 indicators for the condition of the dwelling;
￿ an indicator for condominium status (owned units only).
All of the variables are interacted with indicators for rental status and among owner-occupied units, an
indicator for the presence of a mortgage. Housing-cost differentials are calculated to a series of regressions
similar to the ones above, with the mother tongue of the housing unit determined by the household head.
To calculate the marginal tax rates faced by a nationally representative agent in each of the provinces,
we ﬁrst divide the total population into 17 income groups (from 1-10.000 to 250.000+). We then use Income
Statistics (Table 2A, Taxable Returns by Income Class) from Canada Revenue Agency Data to calculate the
share of the total population in each of the income groups. Subsequently, we obtain the marginal income
tax rate (federal plus provincial) that applies to each income group and each province, using the midpoint
of each income group as the income of the group. The marginal tax rates for year 2006 are obtained from
Walter Harder.
Non-housing cost data are taken from CANSIM and averaged over 2006. They cover the cities of
St. John’s, NL; Charlottetown-Summerside, PEI; Halifax, NS; Saint John, NB; Montreal, QC; Ottawa, ON;
Toronto, ON; Winnipeg, MB; Regina, SK; Edmonton, AB; and Vancouver, BC. Federal transfer differentials
are calculated using the total federal intergovernmental transfers data in 2005-2007 from CANSIM Table
384-0011. CMA level unionization rates are calculated using the 2005 Labour Force Survey Master File.
It is the proportion of unionized workers to the number of workers. The fraction of the employment in
each CMA that is accounted for by the public sector is also calculated using the 2005 Labour Force Survey
Master File.”
ivHousing Quality Product- Land Tax Total
City/Area Name Population Wages Costs of Life ivity Rent Burden Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Census Metropolitan Areas
Vancouver 2,047,650 0.04 0.45 0.13 0.07 1.71 0.009 0.179
Victoria 320,920 -0.04 0.46 0.17 0.02 1.92 -0.013 0.179
Toronto 4,966,660 0.10 0.29 0.05 0.10 0.93 0.022 0.115
Calgary 1,053,840 0.09 0.24 0.04 0.09 0.78 0.020 0.098
Kelowna 159,490 -0.07 0.24 0.11 -0.03 1.09 -0.018 0.091
Montréal 3,534,850 0.02 0.14 0.04 0.03 0.51 0.007 0.058
Ottawa-Hull 1,106,380 0.08 0.13 0.01 0.07 0.37 0.019 0.056
Abbotsford 154,830 -0.03 0.12 0.06 -0.01 0.55 -0.006 0.049
Guelph 125,070 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.13 0.007 0.020
Hamilton 676,780 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.14 0.006 0.020
Oshawa 326,890 0.11 0.02 -0.04 0.08 -0.16 0.028 0.012
Edmonton 1,013,400 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.11 0.005 -0.006
Kitchener 441,420 0.05 -0.02 -0.03 0.03 -0.18 0.010 -0.008
Québec 701,420 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.006 -0.009
Barrie 174,420 -0.04 -0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.014 -0.016
Kingston 147,230 -0.05 -0.05 0.00 -0.04 -0.08 -0.015 -0.023
Peterborough 114,580 -0.06 -0.05 0.00 -0.05 -0.09 -0.018 -0.027
Sherbrooke 182,330 -0.09 -0.06 0.02 -0.07 -0.04 -0.025 -0.029
St. Catharines-Niagara 381,170 -0.02 -0.12 -0.04 -0.02 -0.45 -0.006 -0.051
Brantford 122,420 -0.03 -0.13 -0.03 -0.03 -0.46 -0.009 -0.055
Halifax 366,790 -0.11 -0.16 0.01 -0.09 -0.39 -0.018 -0.057
London 447,310 0.01 -0.15 -0.06 -0.01 -0.64 0.002 -0.062
Windsor 316,170 0.10 -0.21 -0.11 0.05 -1.06 0.026 -0.080
Sudbury 155,990 0.03 -0.23 -0.09 0.00 -0.97 0.006 -0.091
Trois-Rivières 138,160 -0.01 -0.26 -0.08 -0.03 -1.01 -0.001 -0.102
Chicoutimi-Jonquière 149,440 0.01 -0.28 -0.10 -0.02 -1.16 0.006 -0.110
Winnipeg 677,500 -0.08 -0.29 -0.05 -0.09 -0.99 -0.015 -0.114
Saskatoon 228,080 -0.10 -0.30 -0.05 -0.10 -0.98 -0.019 -0.117
Regina 190,790 -0.04 -0.34 -0.09 -0.06 -1.27 -0.001 -0.128
Moncton 123,580 -0.13 -0.35 -0.05 -0.13 -1.13 -0.024 -0.137
Thunder Bay 120,720 -0.01 -0.39 -0.13 -0.04 -1.54 0.000 -0.154
St. John's 178,170 -0.12 -0.44 -0.09 -0.13 -1.50 -0.025 -0.175
Saint John 119,800 -0.11 -0.49 -0.11 -0.13 -1.74 -0.015 -0.189
Non-CMA Areas
BC 1,327,040 -0.05 -0.05 0.01 -0.04 -0.09 -0.010 -0.018
NWT 40,770 0.19 -0.06 -0.12 0.13 -0.66 0.038 -0.028
YT 29,960 0.04 -0.12 -0.06 0.02 -0.55 0.008 -0.047
AB 1,153,770 -0.03 -0.16 -0.04 -0.04 -0.58 -0.008 -0.066
ON 2,530,520 -0.05 -0.20 -0.05 -0.06 -0.69 -0.015 -0.084
QC 2,386,520 -0.08 -0.30 -0.06 -0.09 -1.01 -0.022 -0.123
PEI 133,830 -0.24 -0.48 -0.04 -0.22 -1.37 -0.049 -0.186
NUN 29,270 0.25 -0.55 -0.31 0.13 -2.75 0.050 -0.225
NB 473,080 -0.18 -0.59 -0.11 -0.19 -1.95 -0.039 -0.233
NS 532,270 -0.23 -0.60 -0.09 -0.22 -1.88 -0.049 -0.237
MB 445,220 -0.19 -0.63 -0.12 -0.20 -2.09 -0.042 -0.251
SK 529,430 -0.20 -0.75 -0.15 -0.22 -2.55 -0.044 -0.299
NL 320,930 -0.18 -0.95 -0.23 -0.22 -3.40 -0.035 -0.375
Canada 30,896,860 0.09 0.30 0.07 0.06 0.71 0.020 0.082
Observed Prices Attribute Value Capitalization
TABLE 1: PRICES, ATTRIBUTES, AND VALUES ACROSS CANADIAN CITIES
Wage and housing cost data are taken from the Census 2006 Masterfiles. Wage differentials are based on the average
logarithm of hourly wages for full-time workers ages 25 to 55, controlling for observable skills. Housing cost differentials
based on the average logarithm of rents and housing price, controlling for observable housing characteristics. Quality-of-life,
productivity, land rent, tax burden, and total value differentials are based off of formulas explained in Section 2.2.1 in the text
for the one household-type case. Fuller details on the data are in the Appendix1 Victoria   Toronto   Vancouver
2 Vancouver   Calgary   Victoria
3 Kelowna   Oshawa   Toronto
4 Abbotsford   Vancouver   Calgary
5 Toronto   Ottawa-Hull   Kelowna
6 Calgary   Windsor   Montréal
7 Montréal   Guelph   Ottawa-Hull
8 Sherbrooke   Kitchener   Abbotsford
9 Ottawa-Hull   Hamilton   Guelph
10 Barrie   Montréal   Hamilton
11 Halifax   Edmonton   Oshawa
12 Peterborough   Victoria   Edmonton
13 Québec   Sudbury   Kitchener
14 Kingston   London   Québec
15 Hamilton   Abbotsford   Barrie
16 Guelph   Québec   Kingston
17 Edmonton   Chicoutimi-Jonquière   Peterborough
18 Kitchener   St. Catharines-Niagara   Sherbrooke
19 Brantford   Kelowna   St. Catharines-Niagara
20 St. Catharines-Niagara   Brantford   Brantford
21 Oshawa   Barrie   Halifax
22 Saskatoon   Trois-Rivières   London
23 Moncton   Kingston   Windsor
24 Winnipeg   Thunder Bay   Sudbury
25 London   Peterborough   Trois-Rivières
26 Trois-Rivières   Regina   Chicoutimi-Jonquière
27 St. John's   Sherbrooke   Winnipeg
28 Regina   Winnipeg   Saskatoon
29 Sudbury   Halifax   Regina
30 Chicoutimi-Jonquière   Saskatoon   Moncton
31 Saint John   Saint John   Thunder Bay
32 Windsor   Moncton   St. John's
33 Thunder Bay  St. John's   Saint John 
Quality-of-Life Ranking Total Value Ranking
TABLE 2: CENSUS METROPOLITAN AREA RANKINGS
Productivity Ranking








1 Victoria 275,930 0.86 -0.04 0.48 0.176
2 Vancouver 1,215,480 0.59 0.06 0.52 0.144
3 Kelowna 136,450 0.86 -0.07 0.25 0.113
4 Abbotsford 111,720 0.72 -0.04 0.17 0.073
5 Toronto 2,823,580 0.57 0.14 0.38 0.060
6 Montréal 448,710 0.13 -0.02 0.12 0.050
7 Calgary 805,620 0.76 0.10 0.28 0.050
8 Ottawa-Hull 561,760 0.51 0.07 0.14 0.014
9 Guelph 101,260 0.81 0.02 0.08 0.013
10 Hamilton 521,760 0.77 0.04 0.09 0.012
11 Barrie 155,420 0.89 -0.04 -0.02 0.009
12 Kingston 130,340 0.89 -0.05 -0.04 0.006
13 Peterborough 106,690 0.93 -0.06 -0.05 0.005
14 Halifax 338,550 0.92 -0.11 -0.17 0.003
15 Edmonton 795,610 0.79 0.03 0.02 -0.010
16 Kitchener 337,780 0.77 0.05 0.02 -0.017
17 Brantford 108,240 0.88 -0.03 -0.12 -0.029
18 Catharines-Niagara 309,680 0.81 -0.02 -0.11 -0.030
19 Oshawa 285,270 0.87 0.12 0.03 -0.042
20 Winnipeg 515,180 0.76 -0.08 -0.27 -0.046
21 Saskatoon 198,190 0.87 -0.10 -0.29 -0.046
22 London 366,120 0.82 0.01 -0.13 -0.050
23 Regina 170,940 0.90 -0.04 -0.33 -0.083
24 St. John's 174,350 0.98 -0.12 -0.44 -0.086
25 Sudbury 101,230 0.65 0.00 -0.31 -0.102
26 Windsor 234,100 0.74 0.09 -0.19 -0.102
27 Saint John 111,370 0.93 -0.12 -0.51 -0.106
28 Thunder Bay 101,930 0.84 -0.01 -0.38 -0.122
Panel B: Francophones
1 Montréal 2,359,840 0.67 0.06 0.21 0.046
2 Ottawa-Hull 366,230 0.33 0.10 0.21 0.026
3 Sherbrooke 165,740 0.91 -0.08 -0.03 0.020
4 Québec 672,750 0.96 -0.02 -0.01 0.006
5 Trois-Rivières 134,530 0.97 -0.01 -0.25 -0.078
6 Chicoutimi-Jonquière 146,680 0.98 0.01 -0.28 -0.094
Panel C: Allophones
1 Vancouver 806,880 0.39 0.00 0.32 0.107
2 Toronto 2,080,620 0.42 0.04 0.15 0.028
3 Montréal 726,300 0.21 -0.10 -0.13 0.008
4 Calgary 231,480 0.22 0.06 0.06 -0.007
5 Hamilton 144,830 0.21 0.01 -0.12 -0.046
6 Ottawa-Hull 178,380 0.16 0.05 -0.09 -0.052
7 Edmonton 195,240 0.19 0.01 -0.18 -0.066
8 Winnipeg 132,890 0.20 -0.12 -0.49 -0.099
Wage and housing-cost differentials are calculated by language group according to the component orthogonal to
observable characteristics but related to the CMA indicators interacted with language-group indicators.
TABLE 3: WAGE, HOUSING-COST, AND QUALITY-OF-LIFE DIFFERENTIALS BY MOTHER 














Montréal 0.076 2.802 0.027 0.037 -0.039 0.047 -0.103
Ottawa-Hull 0.029 0.560 0.069 0.085 0.057 0.094 0.051














Toronto 0.096 0.878 0.100 0.046 0.142 0.058 0.133
Vancouver -0.062 0.643 0.072 0.034 0.095 0.043 0.090
σ = ∞ σ = 40
TABLE 4: RELATIVE PRODUCTIVITY OF SPECIFIC MOTHER TONGUES IN 
SELECTED CITIES
Wage and employment ratios expressed in logarithms relative to the national log ratio
(i.e. subtracting the national log ratio). Productivity levels are relative to others in the





σ = 40(1) (2)
Hedonic QOL Rank 0.68 0.72
Places Rated Almanac 0.84
Quality of Life Quality of Life
(unweighted) (pop weight)
(1) (2)
















Adjusted R-squared 0.61 0.66
Number of Observations 24 24
p-value of test that all
coefficients are equal 0.006 0.007
TABLE 5: CORRELATION OF HEDONIC QUALITY-OF-LIFE AND 




Cities Ranked & 
Rated
TABLE 6: QUALITY OF LIFE, PRODUCTIVITY, AND 
INDIVIDUAL AMENITIES
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions in the second column 
are weighted by the sum of individuals in each CMA.Housing Quality Product- Land Tax Total Transfer Non-Hous Housing
City/Area Name Population Wages Costs of Life ivity Rent Burden Value Differ Cost Rents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Panel A: Provinces
BC 4,009,930 -0.01 0.24 0.08 0.02 0.98 -0.002 0.096 0.090 0.071 0.028
ON 11,873,140 0.04 0.04 -0.01 0.03 0.07 0.007 0.014 0.040 0.038 0.017
AB 3,221,010 0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.005 0.006 -0.069 0.001 0.009
QC 7,373,310 -0.03 -0.07 -0.01 -0.03 -0.22 -0.006 -0.028 -0.007 -0.060 -0.026
NWT 40,770 0.19 -0.06 -0.12 0.13 -0.66 0.038 -0.028 -0.233 -0.028 -0.050
YT 29,960 0.04 -0.12 -0.06 0.02 -0.55 0.008 -0.047 -0.235 -0.047 -0.036
NS 899,060 -0.17 -0.39 -0.04 -0.16 -1.17 -0.034 -0.151 -0.180 -0.091 -0.075
MB 1,122,720 -0.12 -0.41 -0.08 -0.13 -1.37 -0.024 -0.161 -0.200 -0.139 -0.104
PEI 133,830 -0.24 -0.48 -0.04 -0.22 -1.37 -0.049 -0.186 -0.221 -0.125 -0.100
NB 716,460 -0.15 -0.52 -0.10 -0.16 -1.74 -0.030 -0.204 -0.241 -0.146 -0.116
SK 948,300 -0.13 -0.53 -0.11 -0.15 -1.81 -0.027 -0.208 -0.265 -0.160 -0.115
NUN 29,270 0.25 -0.55 -0.31 0.13 -2.75 0.050 -0.225 -0.506 -0.225 -0.303
NL 499,100 -0.15 -0.70 -0.16 -0.18 -2.48 -0.030 -0.278 -0.347 -0.186 -0.165
Panel B: Regions
West 7,330,940 0.01 0.12 0.04 0.02 0.48 0.002 0.050 0.006 0.038 0.017
Central 19,246,450 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.001 -0.004 0.020 -0.004 -0.001
Prairie 2,071,020 -0.13 -0.47 -0.09 -0.14 -1.60 -0.025 -0.185 -0.233 -0.150 -0.109
Atlantic 2,248,450 -0.17 -0.50 -0.08 -0.17 -1.63 -0.033 -0.196 -0.236 -0.129 -0.108
TABLE 7: PRICES, ATTRIBUTES, AND VALUES ACROSS CANADIAN REGIONS AND PROVINCES WITH ADDITIONAL 
ADJUSTMENTS
Observed Prices Attribute Value Capitalization
Calculation of differentials in columns 1 through 8 explained in table 1. Transfer differential based on federal integovernmental transfers and
province-level source-based revenues, decribed in Albouy (2010). Non-housing cost adjustment based on CPI data for principal city for province.
"Housing Rents" uses only housing-cost measures based on rental units, as opposed to all units.
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Figure 1: Housing Costs versus Wage Levels across CMAs, 2006Thunder Bay
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Figure 2: Estimated Productivity and Quality of LifeValue Rank Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Victoria 0.168 1 0.162 1 0.113 1 0.057 3
Vancouver 0.131 2 0.126 2 0.078 3 0.040 5
Kelowna 0.108 3 0.102 3 0.083 2 0.059 2
Abbotsford 0.055 4 0.049 6 0.045 4 0.001 15
Toronto 0.048 5 0.074 4 0.039 7 0.025 7
Calgary 0.040 6 -0.036 21 0.004 14 -0.003 16
Montréal 0.040 7 0.060 5 -0.020 22 0.011 13
Sherbrooke 0.016 8 0.037 7 -0.018 19 0.012 12
Ottawa-Hull 0.010 9 0.034 8 -0.003 16 0.013 11
British Columbia, non-CMA 0.008 . 0.002 . 0.020 . -0.024 .
Barrie 0.006 10 0.032 9 0.039 6 0.052 4
Halifax 0.005 11 -0.024 19 0.034 9 0.060 1
Peterborough 0.004 12 0.030 10 0.040 5 0.020 8
Québec 0.003 13 0.024 14 -0.035 26 0.020 10
Kingston 0.002 14 0.028 11 0.037 8 0.020 9
Hamilton 0.001 15 0.027 12 0.023 10 -0.009 20
Guelph -0.002 16 0.024 13 0.020 11 -0.004 18
Edmonton -0.018 17 -0.094 28 -0.019 21 -0.005 19
Kitchener -0.028 18 -0.002 15 0.003 15 -0.012 21
Brantford -0.033 19 -0.007 16 0.013 12 -0.017 24
St. Catharines-Niagara -0.035 20 -0.009 17 0.010 13 -0.013 22
Prince Edward Island -0.036 . -0.071 . 0.024 . 0.049 .
Alberta, non-CMA -0.043 . -0.118 . -0.024 . -0.009 .
Oshawa -0.044 21 -0.018 18 -0.018 18 -0.023 27
Ontario, non-CMA -0.045 . -0.019 . 0.011 . -0.030 .
Saskatoon -0.050 22 -0.107 30 -0.032 25 0.005 14
Moncton -0.053 23 -0.090 26 -0.018 20 0.033 6
Winnipeg -0.054 24 -0.093 27 -0.047 28 -0.003 17
London -0.057 25 -0.031 20 -0.007 17 -0.022 26
Yukon Territory -0.058 . -0.246 . -0.058 . -0.046 .
Quebec, non-CMA -0.064 . -0.043 . -0.065 . -0.041 .
Trois-Rivières -0.079 26 -0.058 22 -0.085 32 -0.045 29
St. John's -0.086 27 -0.155 33 -0.029 24 -0.021 25
Regina -0.086 28 -0.143 32 -0.064 31 -0.014 23
Sudbury -0.088 29 -0.062 23 -0.028 23 -0.050 30
Nova Scotia, non-CMA -0.089 . -0.118 . -0.002 . 0.006 .
Chicoutimi-Jonquière -0.095 30 -0.074 24 -0.098 33 -0.058 31
Saint John -0.106 31 -0.143 31 -0.051 29 -0.041 28
New Brunswick,non-CMA -0.106 . -0.143 . -0.039 . -0.006 .
Windsor -0.112 32 -0.085 25 -0.054 30 -0.072 33
Northwest Territory -0.115 . -0.321 . -0.115 . -0.138 .
Manitoba, non-CMA -0.119 . -0.158 . -0.068 . -0.048 .
Thunder Bay -0.125 33 -0.099 29 -0.044 27 -0.063 32
Saskatchewan, non-CMA -0.153 . -0.210 . -0.076 . -0.028 .
Newfoundland, non-CMA -0.228 . -0.297 . -0.103 . -0.070 .
Nunavut Territory -0.309 . -0.590 . -0.309 . -0.387 .
Transfer-adjusted 
QOL Rent-adjusted QOL
TABLE A1: ALTERNATIVE QUALITY-OF-LIFE MEASURES USING ADJUSTMENTS
Base QOL
Non Housing Cost-
Adjusted QOLValue Rank Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Vancouver 0.179 1 0.174 1 0.126 1 0.088 2
Victoria 0.179 2 0.173 2 0.125 2 0.068 3
Toronto 0.115 3 0.141 3 0.105 3 0.092 1
Calgary 0.098 4 0.023 11 0.063 5 0.056 5
Kelowna 0.091 5 0.085 4 0.066 4 0.042 6
Montréal 0.058 6 0.079 6 -0.002 15 0.030 9
Ottawa-Hull 0.056 7 0.080 5 0.043 6 0.059 4
Abbotsford 0.049 8 0.043 9 0.039 9 -0.005 16
Guelph 0.020 9 0.046 7 0.042 7 0.018 10
Hamilton 0.020 10 0.046 8 0.042 8 0.010 11
Oshawa 0.012 11 0.038 10 0.038 10 0.033 7
Edmonton -0.006 12 -0.082 24 -0.007 17 0.007 13
Kitchener -0.008 13 0.019 12 0.024 11 0.009 12
Québec -0.009 14 0.011 13 -0.048 23 0.007 14
Barrie -0.016 15 0.010 14 0.017 12 0.030 8
British Columbia, non-CMA -0.018 . -0.024 . -0.005 . -0.050 .
Kingston -0.023 16 0.003 15 0.012 13 -0.005 17
Peterborough -0.027 17 -0.001 16 0.009 14 -0.010 18
Northwest Territory -0.028 . -0.233 . -0.028 . -0.050 .
Sherbrooke -0.029 18 -0.009 17 -0.063 24 -0.033 21
Yukon Territory -0.047 . -0.235 . -0.047 . -0.036 .
St. Catharines-Niagara -0.051 19 -0.024 18 -0.005 16 -0.028 20
Brantford -0.055 20 -0.028 19 -0.008 18 -0.038 22
Halifax -0.057 21 -0.086 25 -0.028 21 -0.002 15
London -0.062 22 -0.036 20 -0.012 19 -0.027 19
Alberta, non-CMA -0.066 . -0.142 . -0.048 . -0.033 .
Windsor -0.080 23 -0.054 21 -0.023 20 -0.040 23
Ontario, non-CMA -0.084 . -0.058 . -0.028 . -0.070 .
Sudbury -0.091 24 -0.065 22 -0.031 22 -0.053 25
Trois-Rivières -0.102 25 -0.081 23 -0.109 30 -0.068 29
Chicoutimi-Jonquière -0.110 26 -0.089 26 -0.113 31 -0.073 30
Winnipeg -0.114 27 -0.153 28 -0.107 29 -0.063 28
Saskatoon -0.117 28 -0.174 30 -0.099 26 -0.062 27
Quebec, non-CMA -0.123 . -0.103 . -0.125 . -0.101 .
Regina -0.128 29 -0.185 31 -0.105 28 -0.055 26
Moncton -0.137 30 -0.174 29 -0.101 27 -0.050 24
Thunder Bay -0.154 31 -0.128 27 -0.073 25 -0.092 31
St. John's -0.175 32 -0.244 33 -0.118 32 -0.109 32
Prince Edward Island -0.186 . -0.221 . -0.125 . -0.100 .
Saint John -0.189 33 -0.226 32 -0.135 33 -0.125 33
Nunavut Territory -0.225 . -0.506 . -0.225 . -0.303 .
New Brunswick,non-CMA -0.233 . -0.270 . -0.166 . -0.133 .
Nova Scotia, non-CMA -0.237 . -0.266 . -0.150 . -0.142 .
Manitoba, non-CMA -0.251 . -0.290 . -0.200 . -0.180 .
Saskatchewan, non-CMA -0.299 . -0.356 . -0.222 . -0.174 .
Newfoundland, non-CMA -0.375 . -0.445 . -0.251 . -0.218 .














St. John's 0.401 0.778 0.974 -0.003
Halifax 0.346 0.818 0.980 0.010
Moncton 0.310 0.845 0.943 -0.014
Saint John 0.342 0.812 0.973 -0.014
Chicoutimi-Jonquière 0.541 0.751 0.951 -0.053
Québec 0.492 0.835 0.956 -0.053
Sherbrooke 0.499 0.789 0.885 -0.053
Trois-Rivières 0.542 0.791 0.850 -0.053
Montréal 0.377 0.788 0.975 -0.053
Ottawa-Hull 0.454 0.825 0.984 0.037
Kingston 0.460 0.783 0.935 0.037
Peterborough 0.430 0.841 0.834 0.037
Oshawa 0.425 0.841 0.566 0.037
Toronto 0.239 0.813 0.979 0.037
Hamilton 0.328 0.822 0.737 0.037
St. Catharines-Niagara 0.348 0.812 0.897 0.037
Kitchener 0.296 0.843 0.848 0.037
Brantford 0.312 0.824 0.721 0.037
Guelph 0.295 0.867 0.717 0.037
London 0.333 0.827 0.936 0.037
Windsor 0.421 0.775 0.953 0.037
Barrie 0.276 0.877 0.595 0.037
Sudbury 0.456 0.771 0.977 0.037
Thunder Bay 0.497 0.797 0.976 0.037
Winnipeg 0.423 0.837 0.973 -0.041
Regina 0.444 0.855 0.981 -0.029
Saskatoon 0.436 0.844 0.974 -0.029
Calgary 0.228 0.847 0.982 -0.004
Edmonton 0.298 0.821 0.977 -0.004
Kelowna 0.253 0.830 0.956 0.009
Abbotsford 0.343 0.808 0.644 0.009
Vancouver 0.340 0.792 0.986 0.009
Victoria 0.384 0.825 0.983 0.009
NL,non-CMA 0.438 0.619 -0.003
PEI 0.377 0.798 -0.004
NS,non-CMA 0.345 0.734 0.010
NB,non-CMA 0.338 0.724 -0.014
QC,non-CMA 0.479 0.779 -0.053
ON,non-CMA 0.389 0.808 0.037
MB,non-CMA 0.436 0.839 -0.041
SK,non-CMA 0.367 0.838 -0.029
AB,non-CMA 0.257 0.848 -0.004
BC,non-CMA 0.402 0.790 0.009
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Figure A1: Housing Costs versus Wage Levels across CMAs, 2006Housing Quality Product- Land Tax Total
City/Area Name Population Wages Costs of Life ivity Rent Burden Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Census Metropolitan Areas
Victoria 320,920 -0.04 0.46 0.17 0.02 1.92 -0.013 0.179
Vancouver 2,202,480 0.03 0.42 0.13 0.07 1.62 0.008 0.170
Calgary 1,053,840 0.09 0.24 0.04 0.09 0.78 0.020 0.098
Kelowna 159,490 -0.07 0.24 0.11 -0.03 1.09 -0.018 0.091
Toronto 6,392,240 0.08 0.21 0.03 0.08 0.66 0.018 0.083
Montréal 3,534,850 0.02 0.14 0.04 0.03 0.51 0.007 0.058
Ottawa-Hull 1,106,380 0.08 0.13 0.01 0.07 0.37 0.019 0.056
Edmonton 1,013,400 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.11 0.005 -0.006
Kitchener 441,420 0.05 -0.02 -0.03 0.03 -0.18 0.010 -0.008
Québec 701,420 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.006 -0.009
Kingston 147,230 -0.05 -0.05 0.00 -0.04 -0.08 -0.015 -0.023
Peterborough 114,580 -0.06 -0.05 0.00 -0.05 -0.09 -0.018 -0.027
Sherbrooke 182,330 -0.09 -0.06 0.02 -0.07 -0.04 -0.025 -0.029
St. Catharines-Niagara 381,170 -0.02 -0.12 -0.04 -0.02 -0.45 -0.006 -0.051
Halifax 366,790 -0.11 -0.16 0.01 -0.09 -0.39 -0.018 -0.057
London 447,310 0.01 -0.15 -0.06 -0.01 -0.64 0.002 -0.062
Windsor 316,170 0.10 -0.21 -0.11 0.05 -1.06 0.026 -0.080
Sudbury 155,990 0.03 -0.23 -0.09 0.00 -0.97 0.006 -0.091
Trois-Rivières 138,160 -0.01 -0.26 -0.08 -0.03 -1.01 -0.001 -0.102
Chicoutimi-Jonquière 149,440 0.01 -0.28 -0.10 -0.02 -1.16 0.006 -0.110
Winnipeg 677,500 -0.08 -0.29 -0.05 -0.09 -0.99 -0.015 -0.114
Saskatoon 228,080 -0.10 -0.30 -0.05 -0.10 -0.98 -0.019 -0.117
Regina 190,790 -0.04 -0.34 -0.09 -0.06 -1.27 -0.001 -0.128
Moncton 123,580 -0.13 -0.35 -0.05 -0.13 -1.13 -0.024 -0.137
Thunder Bay 120,720 -0.01 -0.39 -0.13 -0.04 -1.54 0.000 -0.154
St. John's 178,170 -0.12 -0.44 -0.09 -0.13 -1.50 -0.025 -0.175
Non-CMA Areas
BC,non-CMA 1,327,040 -0.05 -0.05 0.01 -0.04 -0.09 -0.010 -0.018
NWT 40,770 0.19 -0.06 -0.12 0.13 -0.66 0.038 -0.028
YT 29,960 0.04 -0.12 -0.06 0.02 -0.55 0.008 -0.047
AB,non-CMA 1,153,770 -0.03 -0.16 -0.04 -0.04 -0.58 -0.008 -0.066
ON,non-CMA 2,530,520 -0.05 -0.20 -0.05 -0.06 -0.69 -0.015 -0.084
QC,non-CMA 2,386,520 -0.08 -0.30 -0.06 -0.09 -1.01 -0.022 -0.123
PEI 133,830 -0.24 -0.48 -0.04 -0.22 -1.37 -0.049 -0.186
NUN 29,270 0.25 -0.55 -0.31 0.13 -2.75 0.050 -0.225
NB,non-CMA 473,080 -0.18 -0.59 -0.11 -0.19 -1.95 -0.039 -0.233
NS,non-CMA 532,270 -0.23 -0.60 -0.09 -0.22 -1.88 -0.049 -0.237
MB,non-CMA 445,220 -0.19 -0.63 -0.12 -0.20 -2.09 -0.042 -0.251
SK,non-CMA 529,430 -0.20 -0.75 -0.15 -0.22 -2.55 -0.044 -0.299
NL,non-CMA 320,930 -0.18 -0.95 -0.23 -0.22 -3.40 -0.035 -0.375
Canada 30,777,060 0.08 0.29 0.07 0.06 0.69 0.019 0.079
ALTERNATIVE TABLE 1: PRICES, ATTRIBUTES, AND VALUES ACROSS CANADIAN CITIES - ALTERNATIVE 
CMA DEFINITIONS
Observed Prices Attribute Value Capitalization
Wage and housing cost data are taken from the Census 2006 Masterfiles. Wage differentials are based on the average
logarithm of hourly wages for full-time workers ages 25 to 55, controlling for observable skills. Housing cost differentials
based on the average logarithm of rents and housing price, controlling for observable housing characteristics. Quality-of-life,
productivity, land rent, tax burden, and total value differentials are based off of formulas explained in Section 2.2.1 in the text
for the one household-type case. Fuller details on the data are in the Appendix1 Victoria   Calgary   Victoria
2 Vancouver   Toronto   Vancouver
3 Kelowna   Ottawa-Hull   Calgary
4 Calgary   Vancouver   Kelowna
5 Montréal   Windsor   Toronto
6 Toronto   Kitchener   Montréal
7 Sherbrooke   Montréal   Ottawa-Hull
8 Ottawa-Hull   Edmonton   Edmonton
9 Halifax   Victoria   Kitchener
10 Peterborough   Sudbury   Québec
11 Québec   London   Kingston
12 Kingston   Québec   Peterborough
13 Edmonton   Chicoutimi-Jonquière   Sherbrooke
14 Kitchener   St. Catharines-Niagara   St. Catharines-Niagara
15 St. Catharines-Niagara   Kelowna   Halifax
16 Saskatoon   Trois-Rivières   London
17 Moncton   Kingston   Windsor
18 Winnipeg   Thunder Bay   Sudbury
19 London   Peterborough   Trois-Rivières
20 Trois-Rivières   Regina   Chicoutimi-Jonquière
21 St. John's   Sherbrooke   Winnipeg
22 Regina   Winnipeg   Saskatoon
23 Sudbury   Halifax   Regina
24 Chicoutimi-Jonquière   Saskatoon   Moncton
25 Saint John   Saint John   Thunder Bay
26 Windsor   Moncton   St. John's
27 Thunder Bay   St. John's   Saint John
ALTERNATIVE TABLE 2: CENSUS METROPOLITAN AREA RANKINGS - ALTERNATIVE CMA DEFINITIONS
Quality-of-Life Ranking Productivity Ranking Total Value Ranking
Rankings based off of data in table 1.